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Abstract 
This study provides simulations showing what global and regional population sizes 
would be if the rest of the world would have experienced similar population growth 
patterns as what was observed in Europe during the demographic transition. In 1820-
2010, slower growth was observed in Europe & North America where population 
increased by 4.6 times to a level of 1,088 million. The population of Asia increased 
from 720 million to 4,165 million. However, the biggest change from 1820 to 2010 was 
observed in regions that had relatively small populations in 1820 – Latin America 
(which increased by 38 times to 597 million) and Africa (which increased by 14 times 
to 1,031 million). Our simulations show that if the French pattern of population growth 
had been followed (French population size increasing by 2.5 1820-2010), the global 
population would have merely doubled during the demographic transition (increasing to 
2.02 times its original size) over the 1820-2010 period. All regions would have had a 
significantly lower population size: Europe & North America would have increased to 
474 million and Asia to 1,453 million, while Africa would have grown to 150 million, 
which is just 15% of its current population. Projections suggest that population 
implications of following the in the coming decades would have been much lower – 
e.g., if Nigeria would have followed the French population growth trajectory, it would 
grow to 72 million in 2100, while UN median variant projections suggest it would reach 
914 million people by 2100. 
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Global and Regional Population Growth if European 
Demographic Transition Patterns Had Been Universal 
Vegard Skirbekk 
Marcin Stonawski 
Guido Alfani 
1 Introduction 
During the demographic transition which in Europe tended to take place from the early 
19th to the end of the 20th century, the population in European countries and its overseas 
offshoots increased by a factor five or less, which is low compared to the increase now 
taking place in most other regions of the world. This study provides simulations 
showing what global and regional population sizes would be if the rest of the world 
would experience similar population growth patterns as what was observed in Europe.  
European1 culture distinguished itself through choices that led to the European 
marriage pattern, characterized by late marriage, significant shares not marrying, low 
levels of extramarital childbearing and comparatively low fertility (Hajnal 1965; Van de 
Walle 1986; Clark 2008). One important consequence was the relatively low population 
growth characterizing the cultures, religions and ethno-linguistic groups where the 
European marriage pattern was dominant.  
2 Defining the Period of the Demographic Transition 
Until recent centuries, high levels of fertility did not lead to rapid population growth, 
due to high mortality rates. This balance implied population growth at extremely low 
levels, with sometimes zero or negative growth. Population growth, resulting from the 
excess of births over deaths, occurs where death rates decline faster than birth rates. The 
process of demographic transition began in Western Europe around 1800, but much 
later in other regions– and it is still underway in many parts of the world today (Rathke 
& Sarferaz 2010; Lee 2003; Coale 1973).  
We define the demographic transition as the movement from a long term 
situation where birth and death rates are high (c. 35-40) to a steady state of low birth 
and mortality rates (c. 10-15). Defining the onset of this process is difficult. The 
European Fertility Project (EFP) defined the onset of the fertility transition as a 10% 
decline in the index of marital fertility, which never again reached pre-transitional 
levels. As we consider the demographic transition to consist of the movement of both 
birth and death rates, we identify the start of the demographic transition. We choose as 
                                                 
1
 In this article, when the European case is discussed, it is referring to Western Europe (i.e., west of the 
“Hajnal” line), and not the entire continent. 
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1820, a year where sustained mortality decline had not been observed in almost any 
country and population growth had been slow - population levels observed then can 
therefore represent population size before the onset of the demographic transition. Most 
scholars place the initiation of sustained mortality decline around this period or later 
(e.g. Lee 2003, 170). We acknowledge that this does not take into account that some 
countries had a much later onset of the demographic transition. However, as population 
growth was modest prior to the demographic transition, this would have relatively little 
effect on the initial demographic values.  
For “end point” values, we use both 2010 values (to assess the population 
growth to date) as well as population size in 2100 (medium variant UN population 
projections, UNPD World Population Prospects - The 2012 Revision) as proxies for a 
population size at advanced stages of or at the end of the demographic transition. We 
acknowledge that many countries would have completed the demographic transition 
long before these years, which would not affect the results to a large degree. We also 
note that some nations are projected to not have completed the demographic transition 
by the year 2100 – a longer projection period is likely to have revealed that the 
differences in population growth between nations are greater, still.  
3 The Demographic Transition Multiplier 
The demographic transition multiplier (DTM) is a simple measure of the change in 
population over the period of the demographic transition. For country j, the DTM is: ���� = ����,�����,�−��� 
Where ����,� is population at time t (post-transition) and ��� is the duration of the 
transition. Therefore ����,�−��� is population at the start of the transition.. The size of 
the DTM depends on the relative growth of the population from time t to time � − ���.  
 
The components of the DTM are births (B), deaths (D) and net migration (NM): ���� = ∑ (��,� − ��,� + ���,�) + ����,�−�������=1 ����,�−���  
The DTM is a measure of two stock variables, population before and after the 
demographic transition. Its scale will be purely determined by the flow of births, deaths 
and net migrants. However, as many nations lack historic data, we are for some nations 
not able to observe the entire demographic transition window. We then provide data for 
the part of the demographic transition that we can observe. With a base year set in 1820 
we are able to observe most of the demographic transition for almost all 
countries/regions. For some countries we only have 1950 as the base year. We provide 
two end points, 2010 (as it is of interest to observe the DTM close to now) and 2100 (a 
period when the demographic transition is expected to have completed for most nations.  
The DTM is a result of a number of complicated factors. First, greater levels of 
mortality and spikes in the death rate, like those caused in many countries by the two 
World Wars or by the Spanish Influenza pandemic, could reduce the DTM; similarly, 
low and rapidly declining fertility would lower the DTM. Sudden decreases in mortality 
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as, say, resulting from the spread of medical innovations could increase the DTM if not 
offset by declines in fertility. Our definition of the DTM also includes demographic 
growth through migration. Migration would lower the DTM of the sending country and 
increase the DTM of the receiving country.  
Figure 1 shows the very different developments over time in the DTM. Here the 
population for Africa, Latin-America, Europe and Asia is considered (population is set 
to 1 in 1820). The European and North American2 population expands somewhat more 
rapidly than the African and Asian populations until the mid 20th century and then 
stabilizes at a level slightly below 5. However, the European demographic transition 
resulted in small effects on overall population size compared to the situation in Asia, 
Latin-America and Africa where the DTM is estimated to reach DTM levels of 8, 34 
and 42, respectively by 2100. 
Figure 1. Population increase 1820-2100 in Asia, Africa, and Europe and North 
America. (population set to 1 in 1820). Source: Maddison (2010), UN (1973; 2013), UN 
medium variant assumptions. 
 
The demographic transitions taking place in many parts of Asia, Latin-America 
and Africa will result in much larger DTMs than observed in historical Europe and 
European offshoots. Asian and African population growth is in excess of that 
                                                 
2
 Europe and North America is considered together in order to account for the fact that large scale 
migration from Europe to North America took place during the demographic transition. Therefore it 
seems more realistic to consider these world regions as one entity. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Europe and
North America
Asia
Latin America
Africa
 4 
documented in the major Western European nations. Moreover, the population growth 
currently taking place in Africa is natural population growth and will therefore have 
different socioeconomic effects than one fuelled by migration, which is usually 
dominated by people in their prime working ages. In contrast to migration-fuelled 
growth, natural population growth can only occur when births outnumber deaths. In 
which case, natural population growth is characterized by either a rise in fertility 
relative to mortality or decline in mortality relative to fertility (Dyson & Murphy 1985).  
Although the DTM’s parsimony is attractive from a methodological standpoint, 
care needs to be taken in its interpretation. For instance, a country may have a high 
DTM because land is abundant and there are few effective immigration restrictions. As 
aforementioned, migration will act to decrease the dependency ratio in the short run and 
subsequently allow greater spending on education and investment (less transfer 
payments to those not working and greater resources per child).  
4 European Demographic Exceptionalism in Terms of Net 
Fertility 
The 2SNRR (2 Sex Net Reproduction Rate) is a measure of how many children of both 
sexes survive to mid-reproductive ages under varying fertility and mortality conditions 
(Keilman et al. 2013). The use of the 2SNRR allows one to compare the European 
demographic transition with those of other world regions. It also focuses on 2SNRR 
variations between cultural, socio-economic and geographically differentiated 
subgroups of present and historical populations around the world.  
The European relatively low net fertility is well documented (Coale & Watkins 
1986; Chesnais 1992) and stands in stark contrast with other parts of the world that 
experienced far greater 2SNRR levels (e.g., Kuwait had a 2SNRR of 6.8 surviving 
children in the mid-1960s). In spite of the fact that the demographic transition took 
place over a longer time period in Europe, it tended to result in lower demographic 
transition multipliers (population size at the end over the population size at the 
beginning of the demographic transition) in European nations than in non-European 
nations.  
From the 19th until the later part of the 20th century, mortality reductions led to 
an increase in the 2SNRR in Europe, rising from around 2 to around 3 children. There 
were seldom more than three children surviving to mid-reproductive age.  
This is relatively modest in an international setting. Figures 2a-c present TFR 
(Total fertility rates – a measure of gross fertility) and 2SNRR during the demographic 
transition in European countries where relevant data is available from the 19th century, 
while Figures 2d-f show the cases of three non-European countries (where 2SNRR 
levels rose to much higher levels) (Source: (Sardon 1991; Chesnais 1992; UN 2013). 
This stands in contrast with the demographic transition in most other world 
regions where, during the period of mortality decline, net fertility increased to high 
levels, causing rapid population growth in a short period of time and generally greater 
levels of overall population increase during the demographic transition.  
The first country to experience sustained mortality and fertility decline was 
France, where 2SNRR remained at around 2 children throughout the demographic 
transition from 1801 until the present. 2SNRR never rose above 2.3 children before the 
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baby boom in the post-war period. In other words, this was not a demographic transition 
where a lag between mortality decline and fertility decline led to high net fertility. 
Similar observations have been made in other European countries. For all European 
countries for which we have data, the highest 2SNRR observed is around 3 children. For 
England, Wrigley et al. (1997) present data from the late 16th century which also 
suggests that there were relatively large fluctuations in net fertility, never exceeding 
three surviving children. This makes the European situation unique compared to the 
transition from other world regions for which we have data. Sardon (1991) shows that 
for 15 European countries with available data, 11 experienced below replacement net 
fertility already for the generations born 1901-1906. Also, “European offshoots” may 
have been early to display low 2SNRR levels, at least for some subgroups. For instance, 
Sanderson (1987) shows that urban white women born 1846-55 in Northeast USA had 
only 1.8 surviving children at ages 45-54 in the year 1900.  
For the European countries, the gradual decline in TFR was matched by an 
increase in longevity and thereby a stability of the 2SNRR. This was for example the 
case of Sweden, where there is slight growth in the 2SNRR from levels around 2 
children to only around 3 children as mortality declined.  
Several studies suggests that non-European societies were dominated by “natural 
fertility” levels, where women bore on average up to 7-8 children and long term slow 
growth rates reveal that only slightly above 2 survived (Cleland 2001; UN 1973). 
Conditions with scarce food and resources, changing temperatures and rainfall, low 
hygiene and recurring famines led to an environment where the long term net fertility 
averaged slightly above 2, with population growth rates being less than 0.02% (UN 
1973)). The European fertility decline was initiated in 1880-1920 (Coale & Watkins 
1986) and gross fertility levels for most European countries reached about 2 children 
around the 1970s, covering a time span of 50-100 years. In Asia, the drop was faster; 
e.g., Singapore and the Republic of Korea took 25-30 years to go from natural to 
replacement fertility, while in countries such as China, Thailand and Mauritius it took 
40-45 years. 
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Figures 2a-c. TFR and 2SNRR from France, Germany and Sweden, 1801/21-2001. 
Source: (Sardon 1991; Chesnais 1992; UN 2013).  
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Figures 2d-f. TFR and 2SNRR from Kuwait, Indonesia and China, 1950-2010  (source: 
UN (2013). 
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fertility, as measured by the crude birth rate, does not decline in tandem with the crude 
death rate. Births stay high and population growth rates reach around 3.5% on average. 
Countries that experience higher 2SNRR levels will experience greater population 
growth. Cleland (2001) notes that the European population and its overseas offshoots 
increased from 200 to 750 million from 1800 to 1950, implying an annual average 
growth rate of about 0.8 % and a demographic transition multiplier of 3.75 for this 
period. 
In countries such as Angola, Somalia, Cameroon, Palestinian Occupied Territories and 
Afghanistan, sustained fertility decline had by 2010 not yet been initiated in spite of 
substantial mortality declines. For the 27 countries with a TFR that rounds up to 6 or 
more children in the 2000s, mortality is in many cases relatively low – e.g., the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories has a mortality similar to the Baltic EU member states 
with an e(0) of 72.3, but a TFR which is 4 times higher, in spite of the fact that mortality 
decline was initiated more than 50 years ago. In Yemen, where e(0) is above 60 years, 
TFR remained at above 6 from 2000 till 2005, with a mortality decline lasting for about 
35 years.  
Figure 3. Trends in birth and death rates over the demographic transition for selected 
world regions.
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5 Causes of the Demographic Transition 
A number of factors have been argued to be causing the early timing of the 
demographic transition in Europe, ranging from ideological change and the 
enlightenment, improved hygiene, housing conditions, economic determinants and the 
industrial revolution, the spread of education, cultural norms (such as abstinence and 
late marriage) that decreased fertility, diffusion of low fertility norms from elite groups 
to the public and changes in contextual and institutional regulations and settings (Coale 
1973; Chesnais 1992; Cervellati & Schupp 2005; Lee 2003).  
Many of the changes that were related to the timing of the demographic 
transition in Europe may have taken place also in other world regions at a similar time 
as Europe. Naturally, different types of society-changing inventions, ranging from 
Egyptian water irrigation systems, Chinese gunpowder, Arabic Numerals, or Indian 
Astronomy have emerged in different parts of the world (Krebs 2004; Huff 2011; Xing 
2013) and it has been argued that even by the nineteenth century some non-European 
areas, and in particular China, were not as backward as is usually implied (Goody 
2006). Possibly, also the demographic transition could potentially have taken place in 
other world regions during the same period or even earlier than Europe. Also, China has 
a long historic tradition of reducing fertility from natural levels, using natural fertility 
limitation techniques (Zhao 2006). The sustained decline in family size towards 
replacement levels and below did originate in Europe (Notestein 1945), but it could 
have been possible that it originated independently elsewhere – and the trajectories 
observed in Europe could have been replicated elsewhere. An additional argument in 
favour of this view comes from Goody, who suggested that differences in household 
structures and systems of household formation across the wider Eurasian area have been 
overstated: both considering issues of measurement/categorization (with European and 
Asian families being more similar than what may be suggested by the straight 
application of specific categories, like Hajnal's distinction between "stem" and "joint" 
systems of family formation), and regarding the impact that different "structures" are 
traditionally credited to have on demographic and economic processes, including 
fertility control - see later (Goody 1996).  
At the individual level, high education has been found to have similar effects 
across different ethnic groups within countries – and the effects are often found to be 
similar for higher fertility subpopulations, e.g., in the US black women with higher 
education have been found to have slightly lower fertility than their white counterparts 
(Maralani 2013) and the fertility of higher educated women in many poorer countries is 
often resemble fertility levels of better educated women in richer nations (Skirbekk 
2008; Jejeebhoy 1995). Likewise, it is potentially possible that factors such as income 
growth, industrialization, urbanization, institutional development, and social change that 
drove the demographic transition could have taken place at the same time elsewhere or 
in Europe. In fact, relative living standards in Europe and Asia recently became a much-
debated topic in world economic history, between those who suggest that as late as the 
eighteenth century, in the two areas living standards were about on par (Pomeranz 2000; 
Lee and Feng 1999) and those who stick to the idea that western European living 
standards had surpassed the Asian well before the beginning of the industrial revolution 
(Broadberry and Gupta 2006; Allen et al. 2011) - although not to such a degree as was 
commonly implied in the past. Medical improvements, better nutrition and the spread of 
more effective contraceptive techniques and preferences for fewer children could have 
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also have spread earlier from Europe (Caldwell 2001; Livi-Bacci 2012). In effect, at 
least some key determinants of the demographic transition could plausibly have taken 
place in many regions of the world at an earlier time than they actually did.  
5.1 Speed of Mortality Decline as a Driver of Low Net Fertility 
The low 2SNRR of Europe may in part be explained by the relatively slow increase in 
life expectancy which gave couples the ability to more accurately predict the number of 
survivors under changing mortality conditions. Non-western countries tended to 
undergo the mortality decline at a much faster pace and at later periods compared to the 
Western nations: e.g., in Sweden life expectancy at birth rose from 45 years to 70 years 
over a period of about 90 years (from 1860 to 1950), while in Indonesia the same 
increase in life expectancy took only about 40 years (from 1965 to 2005).  
The synthesis of historical evidence for Europe, China, Japan and India by 
Wilson and Airey (1999) suggests that long-term stability was achieved in these larger 
societies limiting total fertility to the range of 4 to 6 births, retaining stable populations 
at life expectancy at birth of 25 to 40 years. Furthermore, with an average of 4-5 
children, Europeans had a lower pre-demographic transition fertility rate due to 
restrained fertility behavior. This lower initial level meant that they only had to reduce 
their fertility by slightly more than half to reach replacement fertility. In most other 
world regions, gross fertility tended to be in the range of 6-8 children; thus, a stronger 
reduction in gross fertility was needed to attain replacement fertility under conditions of 
low mortality.  
When mortality declines rapidly, parental estimates of how many surviving 
children are likely to result from a given net fertility are often incorrect. Estimates of 
ideal size for countries early in the demographic transition, as evidenced from 
questionnaires suggest that the ideal family size was seldom above 3, 4, or 5 children 
(Mauldin 1965), and when mortality falls, gross fertility would need to decrease if 
ideals are to be realized.  
The slow European mortality decline, taking more than a century to double life 
expectancy, coincided with low levels of net fertility increases. The same level of 
mortality decline that took a century and a half in European countries transpired in less 
than half that time in many countries from other world regions, such as in Asia. For 
instance, in Vietnam, the growth in life expectancy from about 40 to more than 70 years 
took place in about 45 years, while in France it took more than 100 years (Notestein 
(1953), Coale (1986), Davis (1963), UN (2013)).  
Mortality decline is a necessary but not sufficent condition for lowering fertility. 
Mortality decline implies that unless gross fertility is lowered, more children will result 
in greater demand for parental resources and time. The willingness and capacity to 
lower fertility is also crucial for childbearing restrictions (Jejeebhoy 1995; Coale & 
Watkins 1986; Van de Walle 1986).  
France was characterized by being an early transition country, and it was also a 
country that experienced early ideological and societal change causing the changes in 
family size and the decline in fertility. The enlightenment, the French revolution, 
religious critique, changing social structures and new attitudes towards fatalism were 
among the factors leading to lower fertility (Weir 1984; Shorter 1973).  
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A number of researchers have proposed explanatory frameworks that include 
improved survival as one of several determinants as well as cultural, technological and 
labour market changes along with urbanization and the availability of more effective 
prevention (making sexual abstinence unnecessary for lowered fertility, see e.g., (Mason 
1997).  
5.2 Education Lowered Fertility of the Europeans Historically  
Education is strongly negatively related to fertility in the historical context of Europe 
(e.g., (Bongaarts & Watkins 1996; Chesnais 1992; Cochrane 1979; Skirbekk 2008). In 
several European nations, education levels increased for relatively broad sections of 
society from an early stage, following cultural and ideological long term changes 
including the Enlightement and the general societal spread towards high literacy levels 
(Green 1979; Maynes 1985; Ramirez & Boli 1987).  
Education levels in European countries were relatively high from an early stage, 
with education levels observed in the early 19th century in countries such as Germany, 
England and France, that are still not matched in several countries in the world by turn 
of the 21st century (KC et al. 2010; Morrisson & Murtin 2009).  
High European historical educaiton is likely to be a key reason why Europe had 
relatively low fertility historially. Skirbekk (2008) provides a broad meta-analysis of 
available data sets on historical differentials by level of education and/or social status 
from 1300 to the present. His analysis illustrates that position in a social hierarchy was 
positively associated with the level of fertility in the pre-demographic transition era. 
Over time, however, this positive effect of social status on fertility weakened, 
particularly in the latter half of the 20th century. Female education has been negatively 
associated with fertility for as long as education has been measured. Particularly in 
developing countries that are still in the midst of the fertility transition, the negative 
association is very strong. For instance, in Ethiopia, for example, the DHS data show 
that women without formal education have more than six children on average whereas 
women with secondary or higher education have only two children, a key reason why in 
Addis Abbeba, the total fertility rate has fallen to 1.8 (2010). 
Increasing education levels are widely considered key cause of fertility decline 
during the demographic transition (Basu 2002; Martin & Juarez 1995; Cleland 2002). 
Education tends to be associated with a delay in the onset of childbearing and lower 
fertility outcomes. A close examination of the mechanisms at work suggests that these 
effects are causal and not solely driven by selection into schooling (e.g., those who 
would have fewer children in any case attain a higher education). Education has been 
found to depress fertility preferences, raise female autonomy, increase contraceptive 
practice, raise the opportunity costs of having children, and postpone the timing of 
childbearing (Jejeebhoy 1995; Gustafsson 2001; Kravdal 2002). In many developing 
countries age at marriage is another important intermediate variable in the relationship. 
There is strong evidence that early basic education is associated with later age at 
marriage. In Vietnam, for instance, a year of additional schooling reduces the 
probability of an arranged marriage by about 14 percentage points (Smith et al. 2009). 
As mentioned above, in low fertility industrialized countries the differentials 
tend to be smaller but the association with female education is still clearly negative in 
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most cases. This also seems related to the timing of the onset of childbearing. Education 
could also have self-reinforcing effects on fertility timing, where increasing levels of 
education create a race where one needs to have more and more schooling in order to be 
"on par" or better than others of the same sex-cohort group (Lutz et al. 2006; Skirbekk 
& KC 2012). This can imply that education results in fertility being increasingly 
postponed for each successive generation, since education levels gradually increase and 
more years of schooling are needed to reach a given percentile in the educational 
distribution. Several natural experiments suggest causal effects from educational 
extensions to a delay in the age of fertility in early adulthood. This phenomenon has 
been identified in very different contexts where school reforms have taken place, for 
instance in Norway and Turkey (Monstad et al. 2008; Kýrdar et al. 2011). 
5.3 Abstinence and Low Net Reproduction 
A central feature of the European marriage pattern was that considerable proportions of 
the population showed abstinence from sex and reproduction during much of 
reproductive life. The depressed fertility of the Europeans was caused by sexual 
abstinence through late marriage (in some cases not until the late 20s) and the fact that 
considerable portions of the populations never married, resulting in populations 
foregoing at least a quarter of their natural fertility (Hajnal 1965; Coale & Watkins 
1986; Clark 2008; Wrigley et al. 1997).  During the Middle Ages, late age to marriage 
was not a requirement of formal regulations (according to the Medieval Catholic 
Church, marriage could happen as soon as sexual maturity was reached) so the average 
age at marriage was mostly determined by social customs.  
Recent research suggests that the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century 
might have played a key role in the establishment of the European marriage pattern, 
especially in northern Europe (De Moor and Van Zanden 2010).  What is sure, is that by 
the late medieval times, the age to marriage was used to restrict fertility, in Europe, 
especially in periods of lower resource production, leading to an average woman 
bearing 4-5 children. Iceland is an extreme example of this, as premarital sex was illegal 
and marriage was only permitted to those with the economic means to sustain 
themselves. In Iceland, the death penalty for pre-marital sexual relations (even if the 
woman agreed) was the law during some periods prior to the demographic transition 
unless the couple was about to get married with the permission of the male guardian of 
the woman’s family (Gunnarson 1980).  
In other areas of Europe the doctrine of the medieval Catholic Church was much 
softer regarding premarital sex. Young men were required to at least respect the 
virginity of their fiancée up until marriage, but there was a considerable degree of 
ambiguity on the matter (Alfani 2013, Gaudemet 1987). Juridically, a man who 
"seduced" a woman of good moral standing and then refused to marry her was culpable 
of "rape", even if the woman had agreed to sexual intercourse. The penaly usually 
consisted in a fine, but the real aim of the lay tribunals was to induce the man to accept 
a marriage which often resulted in the cancelation of the fine (Lombardi 2008). From 
the sixteenth century, the Reformation led to significant changes in both the formal and 
the informal norms regulating premarital sex.  
After the Reformation both the Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic 
Church tried to limitate premarital or extramarital sex, including between the betrothed 
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(Goody 2000). The strategy followed was to present premarital sex as a sin, promising 
severe otherwordly penalties to the sinners. In Catholic Europe, after the reform of 
marriage introduced by the Council of Trent (1545-63) young women could no longer 
claim that they presumed a marriage was established by the simple occurrence of sexual 
intercourse, a fact which made premarital sexuality an increasingly risky affair, and 
increased the incentives to stay sexually celibate ahead of marriage. In Protestant 
Europe, lay tribunals progressively introduced harsher penalties, including inprisonment 
(for both sexes) as well as the usual fines (Lombardi 2008).  
Overall, control of extramarital sex was effective in Europe; both in Catholic 
and Protestant areas the incidence of births out of wedlock was minimal. During the 
eighteenth century, it was about 2-4 per cent in England, 3 in Scandinavia, and just one 
per cent in southwestern Europe (Italy, France and Spain). This being said, a significant 
proportion of first births were in fact due to premarital sex: it has been estimated that in 
eighteenth-century France, Germany and England, 10-30 per cent of the firstborn had 
been conceived before marriage (Livi Bacci 2000). Clearly, the post-Reformation 
campaigns had not entirely eliminated premarital sexuality (Lombardi 2008) - but they 
had possibly been much more successful in reducing other forms of extramarital sex. 
Seemingly everywhere across the continent the age of marriage was an effective 
regulator of fertility, one which changed in time reflecting availability of resources. 
Consequently, a substantial number of Europeans may have given up sex for much of 
their adult lives (some entirely) to avoid penalties, to increase resource availability per 
capita and to lower the mortality for their families.  
Other factors may have also contributed to the uniquely low European fertility 
patterns. European patterns of breastfeeding may have depressed fertility to the extent 
that it contributed to longer spacing between children (Wilson 1986). It has also been 
argued that Europeans place a greater emphasis on nuclear family structures rather than 
extended families, causing individuals to postpone childbirth before they have the 
resources to form a new household, effectively resulting in older ages at marriage – 
although the evidence is not always clear (Laslett & Harrison 1963; Smith 1993). 
Even if it seems to be an established fact that net reproduction rates in pre-
transitional Europe were fairly low, it should be noticed that possibly the differences 
with other areas of the world, in particular in Asia, are overstated. For example, in the 
case of China it has been argued that, although age to marriage was generally lower than 
in western Europe, intra-marital fertility was also lower (Lee and Feng 1999). It has 
been hypothesized that this might be due to a lower propensity to sexual intercourse in 
arranged marriages compared to consensus-based unions (Kok et al. 2006; De Moor and 
Van Zanden 2010). The practice of infanticide possibly contributed to further reduce net 
reproduction rates in these areas. 
5.4 Diffusion of Low Fertility from Elite Groups 
Status was generally associated with high fertility historically, but in Europe this 
relationship reversed early in the demographic transition (Bardet 1983). Fertility decline 
is likely to have been initiated by certain economic groups (the richer), certain religious 
groups (e.g., Jews who travelled and mixed with members of other religions), as well as 
certain educational groups (the more literate and educated) (Jejeebhoy 1995; Skirbekk 
2008); presumably this process matched to a large degree the pattern of spread of 
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contraception. However, mortality was also lower among these groups from the onset of 
the demographic transition (Jones & Cameron 1984; Antonovsky 1967), and hence the 
net fertility decrease among elite groups was lower than the reduction in gross fertility 
relative to the rest of the population. Skirbekk (2008) estimates that the average 
variation before 1750 was 36.8% higher than among the lowest social class observed, 
but that this relation gradually diminshed as mortality and fertility fell. In effect, gross 
fertility differentials can be large even if net fertility differentials are smaller and net 
fertility differentials during the demographic transition may be lower than what studies 
often suggest (e.g., L. Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt 2008; Bardet 1983). 
For instance, Innes (1938) suggests that for Britain 1891, wives of agricultural 
labourers had on average 6.7 children, while wives of professional, clerical, and higher 
white collar workers had 5.0 children. However, this 25% higher fertility could be 
reduced if mortality differentials up to the mid-reproductive period werer adjusted for, 
as upper classes had lower mortality (Antonovsky 1967; Livi Bacci 1991). Mortality 
reducing measures included improved health behaviours, which tended to be first used 
by the upper social strata (Jones & Cameron 1984).  
5.5 Economic Determinants 
The growing economic costs of having children versus working drove down fertility 
earlier in many settings (Gustafsson 2001). One study based on the Bangladeshi setting 
concluded that the growing costs of raising children and the greater opportunity costs 
could be more important in reducing fertility than other factors, such as mortality 
decline and cultural change (Shenk et al. 2013). The growing consumption losses 
expected from childbearing during the demographic transition can increase - as children 
start working at an increasingly high age, and expected losses in terms of childbearing 
due to income increases (Lee 2003; Gustafsson 2001). These kinds of models see 
fertility decline as a response to consumers’ demand for children compared to other 
goods (Becker 1967; Schultz 1997). 
In the case of western European, changes in the relative costs of children during 
the demographic transition are usually explained with the new needs of an economic 
system which was being deeply transformed by the industrial revolution. However, the 
causal connection between the process of economic modernization and the demographic 
transition is notoriously difficult to assess, so that the two are better understood as 
closely interacting processes, rather than as one (industrial revolution) "causing" the 
other (demographic transition) (Livi Bacci 2000; 2012). In fact, the historical 
experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows a wide variety of possible 
differential chronologies for the two processes. On the one hand, regarding 
demographic change, in many areas of the developing world the demographic transition 
started well before any significant economic modernization had occurred. Even in 
Europe, this was the case of France which is credited with being the first country to start 
the transition - being at the time a mostly agrarian society while England, the first 
industrial country, experienced a relatively late fertility decline (Livi Bacci 2000; 2012). 
On the other hand, specialists of the industrial revolution pointed out that in some late-
comers the industrialization process started in absence of many concomitant 
transformations (cultural, institutional and social) characterizing the European 
experience (Landes 2003). Overall, this literature strenghtens the idea that the European 
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demographic transition had unique characteristics, due to its complex interaction with 
other largely independent processes. 
As a final point, apart from raising the cost of children, the concomitant 
industrial revolution could have contributed to shape the European demographic 
transition by triggering other processes, like urbanization and changes in family 
structures/family formation, which reduced the final DTM. 
5.6 Contextual Settings 
Voigtländer and Voth (2011) suggest that cultural and technological innovation in 
Europe drove increases in pastoralism, which brought about a rise in female 
employment (partly as female labour was less costly than male labour), which in turn 
depressed female fertility. The rise in less labour intensive pastoralism is suggested to 
have partly resulted from the population decline during the Black Death in 14th century 
Europe. Increased prevalence of work in husbandry may have led to delayed marriages 
and decreased fertility outcomes as it enhanced female employment opportunities. More 
generally, De Moor and Van Zanden (2010) suggest that the shock caused by the Black 
Death to the labour market increased female participation into it and led to more 
balanced roles and power distribution between the genders (as well as favouring the 
establishment of the European marriage pattern; see above).  This is also related to the 
spread of life-cycle service: landlords took in large shares of young female and male 
cohorts, giving them housing and food while they worked. Especially in northwestern 
Europe, a large proportion of 15-24 year olds were servants. Kussmaul (1981) estimates 
that in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England they accounted for 10-12 per cent 
of the total population. Focusing on the age group 15-24, Reher estimates that overall 
30-55 per cent of the young persons were servants in northern Europe, while in southern 
Europe the figure falls to 5-20 per cent (Reher 1998, 206) e. Kussmaul (1981) also 
estimates that two thirds of servants married immediately before or after the end of their 
contracts. Consequently, as already Hajnal (1982) had noticed, the incidence of service 
was inversely related to age to marriage and fertility.  
Fertility limitation may in turn have contributed to early industrialization (as the 
capital-labour ratio was skewed towards the latter), which raised the opportunity costs 
of female childbearing and depressed fertility outcomes (Voigtländer & Voth 2006). 
Other contextual settings that might contribute to explain early fertility decline 
in Europe include social and ideological change in France, from the Enlightenment 
period to the French Revolution, with the diffusion of behaviours (like coitus interrupts, 
an early contraceptive method) that the Napoleonic Wars later spread to much of the 
continent (Weir 1984; González-Bailón and Murphy 2013). However, the causal 
connection between the Revolution and the spread of the use of contraception – and 
consequently, the causal connection between secularization and fertility decline – has 
also been questioned by some scholars, as possibly both phenomena reflected a general 
wave of cultural change in France, investing at about the same time the rural masses and 
the urban elites (Bardet and Dupâquier 1986). The latter view could be better able to 
explain the quick fertility decline occurred in France, compared with interpretations 
involving slow downward spread of ideas or practices first developed by a urban, 
secularized and ideologically advanced elite. 
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6 Projections and Conclusion 
We have illustrated Europe’s unique population history in a historic and international 
perspective. The demographic transition multiplier captures net population increase over 
the demographic transition, and this measure differs considerably across nations. While 
the DTM in Europe and North America was around five or less, DTM levels in other 
parts of the world are much greater. In the following section, we estimate what the 
regional and global demographic implications of having a European DTM could have 
been. The European choice of population behaviour has far reaching consequences in 
terms of global and regional population growth, including effects on greenhouse gas 
emissions, resource use, poverty and income distributions, culture and society. It is 
plausible that the demographic experiences that took place in Europe and European 
offshoots could have been replicated in other parts of the world if social, institutional, 
economic and cultural factors that were present in Europe had been adopted. 
Figures 7a-d and Table 1 show the demographic patterns that took place until 
2010 and projections until 2100 (“Baseline” scenario) along with counterfactual growth 
trajectories assuming European and North American growth patterns would have been 
followed in other world regions (“European World“ scenario). Further, we include 
projections of what the world would look like if it had followed the French demographic 
transition - which had the lowest DTM level (“French World” scenario).  
In 1820 almost 69% of world’s population lived in Asia, 22.5% in Europe and 
North America, whereas the share of African population was around 7% and Latin 
American 1.5%. Until 2010, the proportional amount of Asia’s population decreased to 
the level of 60%, and Europe’s to around 16%. Concurrently, Africa and Latin America 
reached 15% and 8.6% respectively. The UN projects that until the end of the century, 
the share of the African population will grow dramatically and reach 38.6%, at a deficit 
of Europe, Asia and Latin Africa which will be diminished to 10.6%, 43.5% and 6.8% 
in 2100. 
Scenario Year 
Europe & 
Northern 
America 
Asia Africa Latin America 
Australia & 
New 
Zealand 
Global 
Population 
- 1820 234,457 717,890 74,236 15,695 434 1,042,713 
Baseline 2010 1,087,785 4,165,440 1,031,084 596,191 26,773 6,907,273 2100 1,152,924 4,711,514 4,184,577 736,228 47,684 10,832,927 
European 
World 
2010 1,087,785 3,330,713 344,424 72,820 2,014 4,837,757 
2100 1,152,924 3,530,162 365,049 77,181 2,134 5,127,450 
French 
World 
2010 474,398 1,452,570 150,208 31,758 878 2,109,813 
2100 593,152 1,816,186 187,809 39,708 1,098 2,637,953 
Table 1. Population size in 1820, 2010 and 2100 by region and scenario. 
During the period 1820-2010, the global population increased from around 1 
billion to 6.9 billion and according to the UN experts it will reach the level of 10.8 
billion people in 2100. Whereas, if the pace of population growth in the whole world 
had been on the level observed in Europe (Scenario 2), the global population would 
have increased to 4.8 billion in 2010, 70% of what it is today. By 2100 the world 
population would be 47%.  
The French trajectory of population change would have seen the world’s 
population increase to 2.1 billion in 2010 and to only 2.6 billion in 2100, less than a 
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quarter of the current medium variant scenario (Scenario 3). The different global 
population trends by scenario are shown in Figure 7a.  
Figure 7a. Total World Population in billions 1820-2100, by three scenarios. 
 
In 1820-2010, the population of Asia increased from 720 million to 4,165 
million (fig. 7b). Slower growth was observed in Europe & North America where 
population increased by 4.6 times to a level of 1,088 million. However, the biggest 
change from 1820 to 2010 was observed in regions that had relatively small populations 
in 1820 – Latin America (which increased by 38 times to 597 million) and Africa 
(which increased by 14 times to 1,031 million). 
Figure 7c shows the alternative population change in regions under the scenario 
of the European and North American growth patterns. According to this scenario, all 
regions would have grown by a factor of 4.6. In 2010, Asia would have reached only 
3,330 million people, Africa 344 million and Latin America 73 million people.  
If the French pattern of population growth had been followed, see Figure 7d, the 
global population would have merely doubled during the demographic transition 
(increasing to 2.02 times its original size) over the 1820-2010 period. All regions would 
have had a significantly lower population size: Europe & North America would have 
increased to 474 million and Asia to 1,453 million, while Africa would have grown to 
150 million, which is just 15% of its current population.  
We also provide in Table 2 the DTM by country, using 1820 or 1950 as the base 
year and 2010 and 2100 (UN median variant assumptions) as the end year. DTM 
estimates are given for the case if it would follow UN median variant trajectory, the 
European or the French population growth trajectory. Several of the countries lack data 
from 1820, and for these cases we use the population size in 1950 as the base year. In 
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effect, these DTM estimates cover most or a significant share of the period demographic 
transition – and thereby provide a realistic DTM for many nations.   
Table 3 provides population size estimates for 2010 or 2100 for all nations using 
either 1950 or (when data is available) 1820 as a base year. In terms of estimates for the 
national population would have been. Using 1950 as a base year, we do not capture the 
entire demographic transition for many nations, but a large part of it, in particular for 
poorer nations (who tended to be in relatively early stages of the demographic transition 
at this point in time). In terms of the DTM, it is 4.9 (for the European trajectory) or 2.5 
(for the French trajectory) if the base year was 1820. If the base year is 1950, the DTM 
is 1.6 for the European trajectory and 1.9 for the French trajectory.  
The implications of differences in population growth patterns are large. If 
Nigeria would have followed the French population trajectory, it would grow from 38 
million in 1950 to 72 million in 2100, while the UN projections suggest it would reach 
914 million people by 2100. If Brazil would have followed the European population 
growth trajectory it would have grown from 5 million in 1820 to 22 million by 2100, 
rather than the projected growth to 194 million individuals. If India would have 
followed the European population trajectory since 1820, it would have grown from 209 
million to 529 million rather than 1547 million by 2100.  
In sum, this study demonstrates global and regional population growth effects of 
specific cultural and societal characteristics that affect patterns of net fertility over the 
demographic transition. Population growth is more influenced by cultural variation 
causing uneven growth rather than by any universal population growth trajectories over 
the demographic transition. We highlight how culture can have large effects on 
population change, and thereby represent a central mechanism contributing to 
population growth related outcomes, such as environmental outcomes. 
Figure 7b. Population size of Europe & Northern America in 1820-2100, by scenario. 
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Figure 7c. Population size of Asia in 1820-2100, by scenario. 
 
 
Figure 7d. Population size of Africa in 1820-2100, by scenario. 
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Country Index 2010/1820 2100/1820 2010/1950 2100/1950 
Afghanistan 8.7 18.1 3.8 8.0 
Albania 7.2 5.1 2.6 1.8 
Algeria 13.8 20.4 4.2 6.2 
Andorra - - 12.6 14.7 
Angola - - 4.7 23.5 
Anguilla - - 2.7 2.3 
Antigua and Barbuda - - 1.9 2.5 
Argentina 75.6 94.4 2.4 2.9 
Armenia 7.2 4.9 2.2 1.5 
Aruba - - 2.7 2.3 
Australia 67.1 124.2 2.7 5.1 
Austria 2.5 2.8 1.2 1.4 
Azerbaijan 10.3 9.6 3.1 2.9 
Bahamas - - 4.6 6.4 
Bahrain - - 10.8 13.1 
Bangladesh - - 4.0 4.8 
Barbados - - 1.3 1.5 
Belarus 4.0 2.4 1.2 0.7 
Belgium 3.2 3.7 1.3 1.5 
Belize - - 4.5 10.1 
Benin - - 4.2 14.6 
Bhutan - - 4.1 4.9 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 9.2 17.7 3.7 7.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina - - 1.4 0.9 
Botswana - - 4.8 7.3 
Brazil 43.3 43.2 3.6 3.6 
British Virgin Islands - - 3.7 4.5 
Brunei Darussalam - - 8.3 10.4 
Bulgaria 3.4 1.6 1.0 0.5 
Burkina Faso - - 3.6 17.6 
Burundi - - 4.0 24.4 
Cambodia 6.9 11.3 3.2 5.3 
Cameroon - - 4.6 18.4 
Canada 41.8 62.4 2.5 3.7 
Cape Verde - - 2.7 3.1 
Caribbean Netherlands - - 2.5 3.0 
Cayman Islands - - 8.7 9.5 
Central African Republic - - 3.3 8.9 
Chad - - 4.7 25.3 
Channel Islands - - 1.6 1.6 
Chile 22.2 24.4 2.8 3.1 
China 3.6 2.8 2.5 2.0 
China, Hong Kong SAR 352.5 343.8 3.6 3.5 
China, Macao SAR - - 2.7 4.2 
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Country Index 2010/1820 2100/1820 2010/1950 2100/1950 
Colombia 38.5 49.9 3.9 5.0 
Comoros - - 4.4 16.2 
Congo - - 5.1 26.4 
Costa Rica 74.1 84.4 4.8 5.5 
Côte d'Ivoire - - 7.2 29.0 
Croatia - - 1.1 0.7 
Cuba 18.6 9.0 1.9 0.9 
Curaçao - - 1.5 1.6 
Cyprus - - 2.2 2.3 
Czech Republic - - 1.2 1.2 
Dem. People's Republic of Korea 5.6 5.8 2.3 2.4 
Democratic Republic of the Congo - - 5.1 21.5 
Denmark 4.8 6.1 1.3 1.6 
Djibouti - - 13.5 21.0 
Dominica - - 1.4 1.3 
Dominican Republic 112.5 139.5 4.2 5.2 
Ecuador 30.0 48.8 4.3 7.1 
Egypt 18.6 32.2 3.6 6.3 
El Salvador 25.1 22.3 2.8 2.5 
Equatorial Guinea - - 3.1 10.7 
Eritrea 1.8 6.9 5.0 19.1 
Estonia 3.9 2.9 1.2 0.9 
Ethiopia - - 4.8 13.4 
Faeroe Islands - - 1.6 1.7 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) - - 1.3 1.2 
Finland 4.6 4.9 1.3 1.4 
France 2.0 2.5 1.5 1.9 
French Guiana - - 9.1 26.4 
Gabon - - 3.3 10.3 
Gambia - - 6.2 31.0 
Georgia 4.1 2.8 1.2 0.9 
Germany 3.3 2.3 1.2 0.8 
Ghana - - 4.9 11.5 
Gibraltar - - 1.4 1.1 
Greece 4.8 4.1 1.5 1.2 
Grenada - - 1.4 1.0 
Guadeloupe - - 2.2 2.1 
Guatemala 24.1 78.1 4.6 14.8 
Guinea - - 3.5 11.6 
Guinea-Bissau - - 3.1 10.9 
Guyana - - 1.9 1.5 
Haiti 13.7 20.5 3.1 4.6 
Holy See - - 0.9 0.9 
Honduras 56.5 115.8 5.1 10.5 
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Country Index 2010/1820 2100/1820 2010/1950 2100/1950 
Hungary 2.4 1.8 1.1 0.8 
Iceland - - 2.2 2.9 
India 5.8 7.4 3.2 4.1 
Indonesia 13.4 17.6 3.3 4.3 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 11.4 14.4 4.3 5.5 
Iraq 28.3 97.3 5.4 18.6 
Ireland 0.6 0.9 1.5 2.3 
Isle of Man - - 1.5 1.8 
Israel - - 5.9 11.9 
Italy 3.0 2.7 1.3 1.2 
Jamaica 6.8 5.1 2.0 1.5 
Japan 4.1 2.7 1.5 1.0 
Jordan 29.7 59.6 14.4 28.8 
Kazakhstan 7.8 10.3 2.4 3.1 
Kenya - - 6.7 26.4 
Kuwait - - 19.6 52.3 
Kyrgyzstan 10.1 16.8 3.1 5.1 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 13.6 23.7 3.8 6.6 
Latvia 3.5 2.5 1.1 0.7 
Lebanon 13.1 12.4 3.3 3.1 
Lesotho - - 2.7 4.3 
Liberia - - 4.3 17.1 
Libya 11.2 14.2 5.4 6.9 
Liechtenstein - - 2.6 3.4 
Lithuania 3.9 2.7 1.2 0.8 
Luxembourg - - 1.7 2.4 
Madagascar 12.5 62.5 5.2 25.7 
Malawi - - 5.2 29.5 
Malaysia 98.5 147.7 4.6 6.9 
Maldives - - 4.4 6.4 
Mali - - 3.0 21.7 
Malta - - 1.4 1.1 
Martinique - - 1.8 1.5 
Mauritania - - 5.5 18.8 
Mauritius - - 2.5 2.0 
Mayotte - - 13.5 43.3 
Mexico 17.9 21.2 4.2 4.9 
Monaco - - 1.8 3.5 
Mongolia 4.4 6.4 3.5 5.0 
Montenegro - - 1.6 1.1 
Montserrat - - 0.4 0.4 
Morocco 11.8 15.9 3.5 4.8 
Mozambique 11.4 53.4 3.7 17.4 
Myanmar 14.8 13.5 3.0 2.7 
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Country Index 2010/1820 2100/1820 2010/1950 2100/1950 
Namibia - - 4.5 8.8 
Nepal 6.9 8.9 3.3 4.2 
Netherlands 7.1 6.8 1.7 1.6 
New Zealand 43.7 61.9 2.3 3.2 
Nicaragua 31.3 42.5 4.5 6.1 
Niger - - 6.2 79.6 
Nigeria - - 4.2 24.1 
Norway 5.0 7.8 1.5 2.3 
Oman 8.8 12.0 6.1 8.4 
Other non-specified areas 11.6 7.1 3.1 1.9 
Pakistan - - 4.6 7.0 
Panama - - 4.3 7.3 
Paraguay 45.2 82.8 4.4 8.0 
Peru 22.2 30.2 3.8 5.2 
Philippines 42.9 86.3 5.0 10.1 
Poland 3.7 2.5 1.5 1.1 
Portugal 3.2 2.3 1.3 0.9 
Puerto Rico 15.0 11.5 1.7 1.3 
Qatar - - 70.0 79.5 
Republic of Korea 5.2 4.3 2.5 2.1 
Republic of Moldova 5.0 2.4 1.5 0.7 
Réunion - - 3.4 4.6 
Romania 3.4 2.0 1.3 0.8 
Russian Federation 4.6 3.3 1.4 1.0 
Rwanda - - 5.0 16.6 
Saint Helena - - 0.9 0.8 
Saint Kitts and Nevis - - 1.1 1.4 
Saint Lucia - - 2.1 2.1 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - - 1.6 1.4 
San Marino - - 2.4 2.3 
Sao Tome and Principe - - 3.0 9.5 
Saudi Arabia 13.0 17.8 8.7 11.9 
Senegal - - 5.2 23.5 
Serbia - - 1.4 0.6 
Seychelles - - 2.5 2.4 
Sierra Leone - - 3.0 7.1 
Singapore 169.3 201.3 5.0 5.9 
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) - - 28.4 36.6 
Slovakia - - 1.6 1.1 
Slovenia - - 1.4 1.2 
Somalia 9.6 54.0 4.3 23.8 
South Africa 33.2 41.4 3.8 4.7 
South Sudan - - 3.8 15.2 
Spain 3.8 3.4 1.6 1.5 
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Country Index 2010/1820 2100/1820 2010/1950 2100/1950 
Sri Lanka 17.1 17.9 2.6 2.7 
State of Palestine 12.1 38.8 4.3 13.8 
Sudan 6.9 22.5 6.2 20.3 
Suriname - - 2.4 2.7 
Swaziland - - 4.4 7.9 
Sweden 3.6 5.6 1.3 2.1 
Switzerland 3.9 6.5 1.7 2.7 
Syrian Arab Republic 16.1 30.0 6.3 11.8 
Tajikistan 16.3 45.7 5.0 13.9 
TFYR Macedonia - - 1.7 1.1 
Thailand 14.2 8.7 3.2 2.0 
Timor-Leste - - 2.5 7.5 
Togo - - 4.5 17.7 
Trinidad and Tobago 22.1 13.2 2.1 1.2 
Tunisia 12.2 13.2 3.4 3.7 
Turkey 7.2 8.6 3.4 4.1 
Turkmenistan 13.7 15.7 4.2 4.8 
Turks and Caicos Islands - - 6.1 7.4 
Uganda - - 6.6 39.7 
Ukraine 4.1 2.2 1.2 0.7 
United Arab Emirates - - 121.3 197.7 
United Kingdom 2.9 3.6 1.2 1.5 
United Republic of Tanzania - - 5.9 36.0 
United States of America 31.3 46.3 2.0 2.9 
United States Virgin Islands - - 4.0 4.0 
Uruguay 61.3 59.8 1.5 1.5 
Uzbekistan 14.5 16.0 4.4 4.9 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 40.5 59.6 5.7 8.4 
Viet Nam 13.6 12.2 3.6 3.2 
Western Sahara - - 37.4 56.9 
Yemen 8.8 16.3 4.9 9.0 
Zambia - - 5.6 52.4 
Zimbabwe - - 4.8 11.9 
 
Table 2. DTM index for up to 210 countries, population estimates/projections for 2010 
or 2100 (base year 1820 or 1950). Source: UN (2013) median variant projections, 
Maddison (2010). 
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Country 
Baseline European growth trajectory French growth trajectory European growth trajectory French growth trajectory 
starting year 1820 starting year 1950 
1820 1950 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 
Afghanistan 3,280 7,451 28,398 59,249 15,218 16,129 6,637 8,298 11,240 11,913 11,262 14,081 
Albania 437 1,214 3,150 2,217 2,027 2,149 884 1,106 1,832 1,942 1,836 2,295 
Algeria 2,689 8,872 37,063 54,887 12,476 13,223 5,441 6,803 13,384 14,186 13,411 16,768 
Andorra - 6 78 91 - - - - 9 10 9 12 
Angola - 4,148 19,549 97,337 - - - - 6,257 6,631 6,269 7,839 
Anguilla - 5 14 12 - - - - 8 8 8 10 
Antigua and Barbuda - 46 87 114 - - - - 70 74 70 88 
Argentina 534 17,150 40,374 50,436 2,478 2,626 1,080 1,351 25,872 27,421 25,924 32,413 
Armenia 413 1,354 2,963 2,023 1,918 2,032 836 1,046 2,042 2,164 2,046 2,558 
Aruba - 38 102 86 - - - - 57 61 58 72 
Australia 334 8,177 22,404 41,497 1,550 1,642 676 845 12,336 13,074 12,360 15,455 
Austria 3,369 6,938 8,402 9,587 15,631 16,567 6,817 8,523 10,466 11,093 10,487 13,112 
Azerbaijan 880 2,896 9,095 8,433 4,083 4,327 1,781 2,226 4,369 4,630 4,377 5,473 
Bahamas - 79 360 504 - - - - 119 126 120 149 
Bahrain - 116 1,252 1,520 - - - - 174 185 175 219 
Bangladesh - 37,895 151,125 182,238 - - - - 57,165 60,589 57,280 71,618 
Barbados - 211 280 316 - - - - 318 337 319 399 
Belarus 2,355 7,745 9,491 5,601 10,927 11,581 4,765 5,958 11,684 12,383 11,707 14,638 
Belgium 3,434 8,628 10,941 12,594 15,932 16,886 6,948 8,688 13,016 13,796 13,042 16,307 
Belize - 69 309 693 - - - - 104 110 104 130 
Benin - 2,255 9,510 32,944 - - - - 3,402 3,606 3,409 4,262 
Bhutan - 177 717 870 - - - - 267 283 267 334 
Bolivia - 2,714 10,157 19,510 - - - - 4,094 4,339 4,102 5,129 
Bosnia and Herzegovina - 2,661 3,846 2,374 - - - - 4,015 4,255 4,023 5,030 
Botswana - 413 1,969 3,025 - - - - 622 660 624 780 
Brazil 4,507 53,975 195,210 194,533 20,911 22,163 9,119 11,402 81,423 86,298 81,585 102,008 
British Virgin Islands - 7 27 33 - - - - 11 12 11 14 
Brunei Darussalam - 48 401 501 - - - - 72 77 73 91 
Bulgaria 2,187 7,251 7,389 3,533 10,147 10,754 4,425 5,533 10,938 11,593 10,960 13,704 
Burkina Faso - 4,284 15,540 75,274 - - - - 6,463 6,850 6,476 8,097 
Burundi - 2,309 9,233 56,285 - - - - 3,483 3,692 3,490 4,364 
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Country 
Baseline European growth trajectory French growth trajectory European growth trajectory French growth trajectory 
starting year 1820 starting year 1950 
1820 1950 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 
Cambodia 2,090 4,433 14,365 23,587 9,697 10,277 4,229 5,287 6,687 7,087 6,700 8,378 
Cameroon - 4,466 20,624 82,393 - - - - 6,738 7,141 6,751 8,441 
Canada 816 13,737 34,126 50,882 3,786 4,013 1,651 2,064 20,723 21,964 20,764 25,962 
Cape Verde - 178 488 552 - - - - 269 285 269 337 
Caribbean Netherlands - 7 18 22 - - - - 11 11 11 13 
Cayman Islands - 6 56 61 - - - - 10 10 10 12 
Central African Republic - 1,327 4,350 11,851 - - - - 2,001 2,121 2,005 2,507 
Chad - 2,502 11,721 63,286 - - - - 3,775 4,001 3,782 4,729 
Channel Islands - 102 160 165 - - - - 154 163 155 193 
Chile 771 6,082 17,151 18,843 3,579 3,794 1,561 1,952 9,175 9,724 9,193 11,494 
China 381,000 543,776 1,359,821 1,085,631 1,767,682 1,873,534 770,911 963,890 820,305 869,426 821,945 1,027,699 
China, Hong Kong SAR 20 1,974 7,050 6,876 93 98 40 51 2,978 3,156 2,984 3,731 
China, Macao SAR - 196 535 818 - - - - 296 314 297 371 
Colombia 1,206 12,000 46,445 60,223 5,595 5,930 2,440 3,051 18,102 19,186 18,138 22,678 
Comoros - 156 683 2,538 - - - - 236 250 236 295 
Congo - 808 4,112 21,322 - - - - 1,218 1,291 1,221 1,527 
Costa Rica 63 966 4,670 5,316 292 310 127 159 1,457 1,545 1,460 1,826 
Côte d'Ivoire - 2,630 18,977 76,180 - - - - 3,968 4,205 3,976 4,971 
Croatia - 3,850 4,338 2,768 - - - - 5,808 6,156 5,820 7,277 
Cuba 605 5,920 11,282 5,458 2,807 2,975 1,224 1,531 8,931 9,465 8,948 11,188 
Curaçao - 100 148 159 - - - - 151 160 151 189 
Cyprus - 494 1,104 1,156 - - - - 745 790 747 934 
Cyprus - 494 1,104 1,156 - - - - 745 790 747 934 
Czech Republic - 8,876 10,554 11,086 - - - - 13,390 14,192 13,417 16,776 
Dem. People's Republic of Korea 4,345 10,549 24,501 25,000 20,159 21,366 8,792 10,992 15,914 16,867 15,946 19,938 
Democratic Republic of the Congo - 12,184 62,191 262,134 - - - - 18,379 19,480 18,416 23,026 
Denmark 1,155 4,268 5,551 6,992 5,359 5,680 2,337 2,922 6,439 6,824 6,452 8,067 
Djibouti - 62 834 1,300 - - - - 94 99 94 117 
Dominica - 51 71 64 - - - - 77 82 77 97 
Dominican Republic 89 2,380 10,017 12,414 413 438 180 225 3,590 3,805 3,598 4,498 
Ecuador 500 3,452 15,001 24,410 2,320 2,459 1,012 1,265 5,208 5,520 5,219 6,525 
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Country 
Baseline European growth trajectory French growth trajectory European growth trajectory French growth trajectory 
starting year 1820 starting year 1950 
1820 1950 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 
Egypt 4,194 21,514 78,076 135,200 19,458 20,624 8,486 10,610 32,455 34,398 32,520 40,660 
El Salvador 248 2,200 6,218 5,542 1,151 1,220 502 627 3,319 3,517 3,325 4,158 
Equatorial Guinea - 226 696 2,419 - - - - 340 361 341 426 
Eritrea 3,154 1,141 5,741 21,761 14,633 15,510 6,382 7,979 1,722 1,825 1,725 2,157 
Estonia 334 1,101 1,299 959 1,550 1,643 676 845 1,661 1,760 1,664 2,081 
Ethiopia - 18,128 87,095 243,416 - - - - 27,347 28,984 27,401 34,261 
Faeroe Islands - 32 50 53 - - - - 48 50 48 60 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) - 2 3 3 - - - - 3 4 3 4 
Finland 1,169 4,008 5,368 5,762 5,424 5,748 2,365 2,957 6,047 6,409 6,059 7,575 
France 31,250 41,832 63,231 79,059 144,987 153,669 63,231 79,059 63,105 66,884 63,231 79,059 
French Guiana - 25 231 674 - - - - 38 41 39 48 
Gabon - 473 1,556 4,884 - - - - 714 757 715 895 
Gambia - 271 1,681 8,423 - - - - 409 434 410 513 
Georgia 1,072 3,527 4,389 3,026 4,974 5,272 2,169 2,712 5,321 5,639 5,331 6,666 
Germany 24,905 70,094 83,017 56,902 115,549 122,468 50,392 63,007 105,739 112,071 105,950 132,472 
Ghana - 4,981 24,263 57,210 - - - - 7,514 7,964 7,529 9,414 
Gibraltar - 20 29 23 - - - - 31 33 31 39 
Greece 2,312 7,566 11,110 9,365 10,727 11,369 4,678 5,849 11,414 12,097 11,436 14,299 
Grenada - 77 105 77 - - - - 116 123 116 145 
Guadeloupe - 210 459 448 - - - - 317 336 317 397 
Guatemala 595 3,146 14,342 46,462 2,761 2,926 1,204 1,505 4,746 5,030 4,755 5,946 
Guinea - 3,094 10,876 35,768 - - - - 4,667 4,946 4,676 5,847 
Guinea-Bissau - 518 1,587 5,628 - - - - 782 828 783 979 
Guyana - 407 786 604 - - - - 613 650 615 768 
Haiti 723 3,221 9,896 14,799 3,354 3,555 1,463 1,829 4,859 5,150 4,869 6,088 
Holy See - 1 1 1 - - - - 1 1 1 2 
Honduras 135 1,487 7,621 15,627 626 664 273 342 2,244 2,378 2,248 2,811 
Hungary 4,146 9,338 10,015 7,661 19,236 20,388 8,389 10,489 14,086 14,930 14,114 17,648 
Iceland - 143 318 413 - - - - 215 228 216 270 
India 209,000 376,325 1,205,625 1,546,833 969,674 1,027,739 422,888 528,748 567,700 601,694 568,834 711,228 
Indonesia 17,927 72,592 240,676 315,296 83,174 88,154 36,273 45,353 109,508 116,065 109,727 137,194 
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Baseline European growth trajectory French growth trajectory European growth trajectory French growth trajectory 
starting year 1820 starting year 1950 
1820 1950 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 6,560 17,119 74,462 94,324 30,436 32,258 13,273 16,596 25,825 27,371 25,877 32,354 
Iraq 1,093 5,719 30,962 106,319 5,071 5,375 2,212 2,765 8,628 9,144 8,645 10,809 
Ireland 7,101 2,913 4,468 6,596 32,946 34,919 14,368 17,965 4,395 4,658 4,403 5,506 
Isle of Man - 55 84 98 - - - - 83 88 84 104 
Israel - 1,258 7,420 15,011 - - - - 1,898 2,011 1,901 2,377 
Italy 20,176 46,367 60,509 54,598 93,608 99,214 40,824 51,043 69,946 74,134 70,086 87,630 
Jamaica 401 1,403 2,741 2,052 1,860 1,972 811 1,014 2,116 2,243 2,121 2,651 
Japan 31,000 82,199 127,353 84,471 143,827 152,440 62,725 78,427 124,001 131,426 124,249 155,351 
Jordan 217 449 6,455 12,924 1,007 1,067 439 549 677 718 678 848 
Kazakhstan 2,041 6,703 15,921 20,938 9,471 10,038 4,130 5,164 10,112 10,717 10,132 12,668 
Kenya - 6,077 40,909 160,423 - - - - 9,167 9,716 9,185 11,485 
Kuwait - 152 2,992 7,960 - - - - 230 243 230 288 
Kyrgyzstan 530 1,740 5,334 8,924 2,461 2,608 1,073 1,342 2,625 2,782 2,630 3,288 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 470 1,683 6,396 11,153 2,181 2,311 951 1,189 2,539 2,691 2,544 3,181 
Latvia 591 1,949 2,091 1,459 2,740 2,904 1,195 1,494 2,940 3,116 2,946 3,683 
Lebanon 332 1,335 4,341 4,114 1,540 1,633 672 840 2,013 2,134 2,017 2,522 
Lesotho - 734 2,009 3,183 - - - - 1,107 1,173 1,109 1,387 
Liberia - 930 3,958 15,905 - - - - 1,403 1,487 1,406 1,758 
Libya 538 1,113 6,041 7,639 2,496 2,646 1,089 1,361 1,680 1,780 1,683 2,104 
Liechtenstein - 14 36 47 - - - - 21 22 21 26 
Lithuania 779 2,567 3,068 2,105 3,613 3,829 1,576 1,970 3,873 4,105 3,881 4,852 
Luxembourg - 296 508 716 - - - - 447 473 447 559 
Madagascar 1,683 4,084 21,080 105,128 7,808 8,276 3,405 4,258 6,160 6,529 6,172 7,718 
Malawi - 2,881 15,014 84,986 - - - - 4,346 4,606 4,354 5,444 
Malaysia 287 6,110 28,276 42,400 1,332 1,411 581 726 9,217 9,769 9,235 11,547 
Maldives - 74 326 474 - - - - 111 118 111 139 
Mali - 4,638 13,986 100,751 - - - - 6,996 7,415 7,010 8,765 
Malta - 312 425 336 - - - - 471 499 472 590 
Martinique - 222 401 335 - - - - 335 355 336 420 
Mauritania - 660 3,609 12,397 - - - - 996 1,056 998 1,248 
Mauritius - 493 1,231 983 - - - - 744 789 746 932 
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Baseline European growth trajectory French growth trajectory European growth trajectory French growth trajectory 
starting year 1820 starting year 1950 
1820 1950 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 
Mayotte - 15 204 656 - - - - 23 24 23 29 
Mexico 6,587 28,296 117,886 139,795 30,561 32,391 13,328 16,664 42,685 45,241 42,770 53,477 
Monaco - 20 37 70 - - - - 30 32 30 38 
Mongolia 619 780 2,713 3,937 2,872 3,044 1,252 1,566 1,177 1,247 1,179 1,475 
Montenegro - 395 620 422 - - - - 595 631 597 746 
Montserrat - 14 5 6 - - - - 20 22 20 26 
Morocco 2,689 8,986 31,642 42,726 12,476 13,223 5,441 6,803 13,556 14,367 13,583 16,983 
Mozambique 2,096 6,442 23,967 112,018 9,725 10,307 4,241 5,303 9,718 10,300 9,738 12,175 
Myanmar 3,506 17,527 51,931 47,413 16,266 17,240 7,094 8,870 26,440 28,024 26,493 33,125 
Namibia - 485 2,179 4,263 - - - - 732 776 734 917 
Nepal 3,881 8,140 26,846 34,410 18,006 19,084 7,853 9,819 12,280 13,015 12,304 15,384 
Netherlands 2,333 10,027 16,615 15,964 10,824 11,472 4,721 5,902 15,126 16,032 15,156 18,950 
New Zealand 100 1,908 4,368 6,187 464 492 202 253 2,878 3,051 2,884 3,606 
Nicaragua 186 1,295 5,822 7,902 863 915 376 471 1,954 2,071 1,957 2,447 
Niger - 2,560 15,894 203,781 - - - - 3,861 4,093 3,869 4,838 
Nigeria - 37,860 159,708 913,834 - - - - 57,113 60,533 57,227 71,552 
Norway 970 3,265 4,891 7,609 4,500 4,770 1,963 2,454 4,926 5,221 4,936 6,171 
Oman 318 456 2,803 3,813 1,475 1,564 643 805 689 730 690 863 
Other non-specified areas 2,000 7,562 23,146 14,166 9,279 9,835 4,047 5,060 11,407 12,090 11,430 14,291 
Pakistan - 37,542 173,149 263,320 - - - - 56,634 60,025 56,747 70,952 
Panama - 860 3,678 6,277 - - - - 1,297 1,374 1,299 1,625 
Paraguay 143 1,473 6,460 11,841 663 703 289 362 2,222 2,356 2,227 2,784 
Peru 1,317 7,632 29,263 39,773 6,110 6,476 2,665 3,332 11,514 12,203 11,537 14,425 
Philippines 2,176 18,580 93,444 187,702 10,096 10,700 4,403 5,505 28,029 29,708 28,085 35,116 
Poland 10,426 24,824 38,199 26,085 48,372 51,269 21,096 26,377 37,448 39,690 37,523 46,916 
Portugal 3,297 8,417 10,590 7,457 15,297 16,213 6,671 8,341 12,697 13,458 12,723 15,907 
Puerto Rico 248 2,218 3,710 2,853 1,151 1,220 502 627 3,346 3,546 3,353 4,192 
Qatar - 25 1,750 1,987 - - - - 38 40 38 47 
Republic of Korea 9,395 19,211 48,454 40,548 43,589 46,199 19,010 23,768 28,981 30,716 29,039 36,308 
Republic of Moldova 713 2,341 3,573 1,702 3,306 3,504 1,442 1,803 3,531 3,743 3,539 4,424 
Réunion - 248 845 1,150 - - - - 374 397 375 469 
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Baseline European growth trajectory French growth trajectory European growth trajectory French growth trajectory 
starting year 1820 starting year 1950 
1820 1950 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 
Romania 6,389 16,236 21,861 12,603 29,642 31,417 12,927 16,163 24,493 25,960 24,542 30,685 
Russian Federation 31,088 102,799 143,618 101,882 144,237 152,874 62,904 78,650 155,075 164,362 155,385 194,282 
Rwanda - 2,186 10,837 36,217 - - - - 3,298 3,495 3,305 4,132 
Saint Helena - 5 4 4 - - - - 8 8 8 9 
Saint Kitts and Nevis - 46 52 64 - - - - 69 74 70 87 
Saint Lucia - 83 177 171 - - - - 125 132 125 156 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - 67 109 96 - - - - 101 107 101 127 
San Marino - 13 31 29 - - - - 19 20 19 24 
Sao Tome and Principe - 60 178 568 - - - - 91 96 91 113 
Saudi Arabia 2,091 3,121 27,258 37,195 9,701 10,282 4,231 5,290 4,709 4,991 4,718 5,899 
Senegal - 2,477 12,951 58,180 - - - - 3,736 3,960 3,744 4,681 
Serbia - 6,732 9,647 4,054 - - - - 10,156 10,764 10,176 12,723 
Seychelles - 36 91 87 - - - - 55 58 55 69 
Sierra Leone - 1,944 5,752 13,890 - - - - 2,933 3,108 2,938 3,674 
Singapore 30 1,022 5,079 6,040 139 148 61 76 1,542 1,634 1,545 1,932 
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) - 1 43 55 - - - - 2 2 2 3 
Slovakia - 3,437 5,433 3,892 - - - - 5,184 5,495 5,195 6,495 
Slovenia - 1,473 2,054 1,803 - - - - 2,222 2,355 2,227 2,784 
Somalia 1,000 2,264 9,636 53,966 4,640 4,917 2,023 2,530 3,415 3,620 3,422 4,279 
South Africa 1,550 13,683 51,452 64,135 7,191 7,622 3,136 3,921 20,642 21,878 20,683 25,860 
South Sudan - 2,583 9,941 39,267 - - - - 3,896 4,130 3,904 4,882 
Spain 12,203 28,070 46,182 41,662 56,617 60,007 24,691 30,872 42,344 44,880 42,429 53,050 
Sri Lanka 1,213 8,076 20,759 21,729 5,628 5,965 2,454 3,069 12,183 12,912 12,207 15,263 
State of Palestine 332 932 4,013 12,866 1,540 1,633 672 840 1,406 1,490 1,409 1,761 
Sudan 5,156 5,734 35,652 116,141 23,922 25,354 10,433 13,044 8,650 9,168 8,667 10,837 
Suriname - 215 525 571 - - - - 324 344 325 406 
Swaziland - 273 1,193 2,156 - - - - 412 436 413 516 
Sweden 2,573 7,010 9,382 14,468 11,938 12,653 5,206 6,509 10,575 11,208 10,596 13,248 
Switzerland 1,986 4,668 7,831 12,822 9,214 9,766 4,018 5,024 7,042 7,464 7,056 8,822 
Syrian Arab Republic 1,337 3,413 21,533 40,114 6,203 6,575 2,705 3,382 5,149 5,457 5,159 6,451 
Tajikistan 467 1,532 7,627 21,313 2,165 2,295 944 1,181 2,310 2,449 2,315 2,894 
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Baseline European growth trajectory French growth trajectory European growth trajectory French growth trajectory 
starting year 1820 starting year 1950 
1820 1950 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 2010 2100 
TFYR Macedonia - 1,254 2,102 1,327 - - - - 1,892 2,006 1,896 2,371 
Thailand 4,665 20,607 66,402 40,542 21,644 22,940 9,439 11,802 31,087 32,948 31,149 38,946 
Timor-Leste - 433 1,079 3,265 - - - - 654 693 655 819 
Togo - 1,395 6,306 24,659 - - - - 2,105 2,231 2,109 2,637 
Trinidad and Tobago 60 646 1,328 790 278 295 121 152 974 1,032 976 1,220 
Tunisia 875 3,099 10,632 11,556 4,060 4,303 1,770 2,214 4,674 4,954 4,684 5,856 
Turkey 10,074 21,238 72,138 86,465 46,739 49,538 20,384 25,486 32,039 33,958 32,103 40,139 
Turkmenistan 367 1,211 5,042 5,766 1,704 1,806 743 929 1,827 1,936 1,830 2,289 
Turks and Caicos Islands - 5 31 37 - - - - 8 8 8 10 
Uganda - 5,158 33,987 204,596 - - - - 7,781 8,247 7,797 9,749 
Ukraine 11,215 37,298 46,050 24,629 52,035 55,151 22,693 28,374 56,265 59,634 56,377 70,490 
United Arab Emirates - 70 8,442 13,759 - - - - 105 111 105 132 
United Kingdom 21,239 50,616 62,066 77,175 98,540 104,441 42,975 53,732 76,356 80,928 76,509 95,661 
United Republic of Tanzania - 7,650 44,973 275,624 - - - - 11,540 12,231 11,563 14,458 
United States of America 9,981 157,813 312,247 462,070 46,305 49,078 20,194 25,250 238,066 252,322 238,542 298,256 
United States Virgin Islands - 27 106 107 - - - - 40 43 41 51 
Uruguay 55 2,239 3,372 3,292 255 270 111 139 3,377 3,579 3,384 4,231 
Uzbekistan 1,919 6,314 27,769 30,791 8,904 9,437 3,883 4,855 9,525 10,095 9,544 11,933 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 718 5,094 29,043 42,772 3,331 3,531 1,453 1,816 7,684 8,144 7,699 9,627 
Viet Nam 6,551 24,949 89,047 80,122 30,394 32,214 13,255 16,573 37,637 39,891 37,712 47,153 
Western Sahara - 14 515 783 - - - - 21 22 21 26 
Yemen 2,593 4,661 22,763 42,181 12,030 12,751 5,247 6,560 7,032 7,453 7,046 8,809 
Zambia - 2,372 13,217 124,302 - - - - 3,579 3,793 3,586 4,484 
Zimbabwe - 2,747 13,077 32,608 - - - - 4,144 4,392 4,152 5,191 
 
Table 3. Population size (in millions) by country for the years 1820, 1950, 2010 and 2100 by scenario. 
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